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KANSAS V. HENDRICKS: IS IT TIME TO LOCK
THE DOOR AND THROW AWAY THE




Leroy Hendricks is every parent's nightmare. Now in his sixties, Hen-
dricks, a pedophile, has repeatedly molested children throughout his
adult life.1 In 1955, Hendricks pled guilty to indecent exposure after ex-
posing himself to two young girls.' Two years later, he was "convicted of
lewdne:s for playing strip poker with a teenage girl."3 In 1960, he was
imprisoned for three years after molesting two young boys at a carnival.'
Shortly after his release, Hendricks again was arrested and convicted for
molesting a seven-year-old girl.5 Then, in 1967, he was imprisoned for
sexually molesting a young girl and boy.6 Finally, in 1984, Hendricks was
imprisoned for indecent liberties after molesting his stepdaughter and
stepson.7
In 1994, Hendricks was scheduled to be released from prison after serv-
ing nearly ten years for his latest offense.8 Under the Kansas Sexually







A review of the most frequently cited cases suggests that recidivism rates [for sex
offenders such as Hendricks] range from 10% to 40% for molesters and from 7%
to 35% for rapists. If those statistics seem low, remember that they are based on
rearrests. Sex crimes are severely underreported. A survey of pedophiles reveals
that the average offender commits 282 illegal acts with 150 victims.
Michael G. Planty & Louise van der Does, Megan's Laws Aren't Enough, WALL ST. J., July
17, 1997, at A22. "A California study evaluated sex offenders over a 15-year period and
found nearly 50 percent of them were rearrested - 20 percent for a subsequent sex of-
fense." Tom Bromwell, Close to Home - A Stronger Megan's Law, WASH. POST, Sept. 28,
1997, at C08.
8. In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130 (Kan. 1996). "Accord-
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Violent Predator Act (the "KSVP Act"), however, Hendricks was invol-
untarily committed to a psychiatric hospital rather than released.9 The
KSVP Act allows for the involuntary commitment of sexually violent
predators, after they serve their time in prison, if they suffer from a
mental abnormality that make them likely to commit predatory acts of
sexual violence. 10
ing to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the average rapist serves just five years in state
prison; a defendant convicted of sexual assault serves just under three years." Michael G.
Planty & Louise van der Does, supra note 7, at A22.
9. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01, (1995). Howard Zonana in his article, "The Civil
Commitment of Sex Offenders," summarizes how "society has struggled with the question
of what to do with sex offenders." Howard Zonana, The Civil Commitment of Sex Offend-
ers, 278 SCIENCE 5341 (Nov. 14 1997). He states:
[b]etween 1930 and 1960, a number of states passed 'sexual psychopath laws' that
offered indefinite hospitalization and treatment in lieu of incarceration for of-
fenders who committed repetitive sexual crimes. When treatment was not suffi-
ciently effective, and when retribution became a more primary goal than
rehabilitation, these statutes were repealed or fell into disuse. Sex offenders were
then given very long sentences with the opportunity for earlier release if they
were deemed safe by parole boards. This era of so-called 'indeterminate sentenc-
ing' was replaced in the 1980s by the present era of 'determinate sentencing.' The
mandatory sentence now is based on the average time offenders used to spend in
prison for a given offense under the old indeterminate sentencing system.
One consequence of this policy change in criminal justice has been that offenders
had to be released at the end of a relatively brief fixed sentence, and a number of
them inevitably repeated some particularly heinous crimes. The legislature of the
state of Washington reacted to this by passing the first of the 'sexual predator'
statutes in 1990. Over the next ... [five] ... years, several states [including Kan-
sas] passed similar legislation or revived their old sexual psychopath statutes.
These new statutes permitted state officials, under civil law, to commit offenders
who were considered dangerous if, at the end of their sentence, they met the
criteria of a 'sexual predator.' In order to do so, offenders had to have a 'mental
abnormality' that would lead to the commission of further crimes.
Id.
10. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1995). "Predatory" as defined by the Act means:
"acts directed towards strangers or individuals with whom relationships have been estab-
lished or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization." See id. § 59-20a02(c). "Sex-
ually violent offense" as defined by the Act means:
(1) Rape as defined in K.S.A. 21-3502 and amendments thereto; (2) indecent lib-
erties with a child as defined in K.S.A. 21-3503 and amendments thereto; (3) ag-
gravated indecent liberties with a child as defined in K.S.A. 21-3504 and
amendments thereto; (4) criminal sodomy as defined in subsection (a)(2) and
(a)(3) of K.S.A. 21-3505 and amendments thereto; (5) aggravated criminal sod-
omy as defined in K.S.A. 21-3506 and amendments thereto; (6) indecent solicita-
tion of a child as defined in K.S.A. 21-3510 and amendments thereto; (7)
aggravated indecent solicitation of a child as defined in K.S.A. 21-2511 and
amendments thereto; (8) sexual exploitation of a child as defined in K.S.A. 21-
3516 and amendments thereto; (9) aggravated sexual battery as defined in K.S.A.
21-3518 and amendments thereto; (10) any conviction for a felony offense as de-
Kansas v. Hendricks
Leroy Hendricks recently challenged the constitutionality of Kansas'
Sexually Violent Predator Act before the United States Supreme Court
in Kansas v. Hendricks." Hendricks claimed that, by allowing for the
involuntary commitment of sexually violent predators after they serve
their time in prison, the KSVP Act violates substantive due process, equal
protection, the prohibition against double jeopardy and ex post facto
laws.' 2
On June 23, 1997, the United States Supreme Court, in a 5 to 4 deci-
sion, rendered its opinion in Kansas v. Hendricks and upheld the KSVP
Act as constitutional.13 The Court held that the KSVP Act comports with
substantive due process because it requires a finding of both dangerous-
ness and mental abnormality or personality disorder prior to commit-
ment.1  The Court stated that it has "sustained civil commitment statutes
when they have coupled proof of dangerouness with the proof of some
additional factor, such as a 'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality."'' 5
The Ccurt held that "Hendricks' diagnosis as a pedophile, which qualifies
as a 'mental abnormality' under the Act ... plainly suffices for due pro-
cess purposes. ,
16
The opinion rendered by the United States Supreme Court is signifi-
cant because, prior to June of 1997, at least five state courts had ruled on
the con stitutionality of sexually violent predator acts similar to Kansas'
Sexually Violent Predator Act. 7 The Washington Supreme Court, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court and the Minnesota Court of Appeals all up-
held their respective state acts as consistent with substantive due pro-
finec. in subparagraphs (1) through (9) or any federal or other state conviction for
a felany offense that under the laws of this state would be a sexually violent of-
fense as defined in this section; (11) an attempt, conspiracy or criminal solicita-
tion, as defined in K.S.A. 21-3301, 21-3302 and 21-3303, and amendments thereto,
of a sexually violent offense as defined in this subsection; or (12) any act which
either at the time of sentencing for the offense or subsequently during civil com-
mitrment proceedings pursuant to this act, has been determined beyond a reason-
able doubt to have been sexually motivated.
KAN. STAT. AN. § 59-29a02(e) (1995).
11. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (1997).
12. This Note addresses only the substantive due process claim.
13. L endricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2072.
14. h1. at 2072-81.
15. I. at 2080.
16. I. at 2080-81.
17. S.e Asiz. REV. STAT. §§ 13-4601-13-4609 (West 1997); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 6600 (West 1997); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02 (West 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 71.09 (West 1997); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980 (West 1997).
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cess.18 The United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington and the Kansas Supreme Court, however, both concluded
their state acts violated substantive due process because they committed
individuals to mental institutions who were not "mentally ill."19
This Note analyzes why the United States Supreme Court rightfully
upheld the KSVP Act as fully comporting with substantive due process:
the Act requires a state to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that an
individual is both mentally ill and dangerous prior to civil commitment.
This Note explains why there is no constitutional or clinical significance
to the term "mental illness." Further, this Note analyzes why the United
States Supreme Court was correct in requiring proof of something more
than mere dangerousness prior to indefinite involuntary commitment
under the KSVP Act.
II. THE KANSAS SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATOR AcT
The Kansas Legislature adopted the KSVP Act in 1994 in an attempt to
combat the public safety problems caused by recidivist sexual offenders.20
The preamble of the Act declares:
The legislature finds that a small but extremely dangerous group
of sexually violent predators exist who do not have a mental
disease or defect that renders them appropriate for involuntary
treatment pursuant to the [existing Kansas involuntary civil
commitment statute], which is intended to provide short-term
treatment to individuals with serious mental disorders and then
return them to the community. In contrast. . ., sexually violent
predators generally have antisocial personality features which
are unamenable to existing mental illness treatment modalities
and those features render them likely to engage in sexually vio-
18. See In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996); In re Young, 857 P.2d
989 (Wash. 1993); State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115 (Wisc. 1995).
19. See Young v. Weston, 898 F. Supp. 744 (W.D. Wash. 1995); In re Care and Treat-
ment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129 (Kan. 1996). In Young v. Weston, an inmate being held
pursuant to Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Confinement Act petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus, claiming that the act was unconstitutional. Young, 898 F. Supp. at 749.
The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington held "[t]he essen-
tial component missing from the Sexually Violent Predator Statute is the requirement that
the detainee be mentally ill." Id. Washington's Sexually Violent Predator Act, like the
KSVP Act, committed sexually violent predators who have been convicted of or charged
with a crime of sexual violence and who suffer from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. Id.
at 746.
20. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1995).
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lent behavior. The legislature further finds the sexually violent
predators' likelihood of engaging in repeat acts of predatory
sexual violence is high. The existing involuntary commitment
procedure ... is inadequate to address the risk these sexually
violent predators pose to society. The legislature further finds
that the prognosis for rehabilitating sexually violent predators in
a prison setting is poor, the treatment needs of this population
are very long term and the treatment modalities for this popula-
tion are very different than the traditional treatment modalities
. .., therefore a civil commitment procedure for the long-term
care and treatment of the sexually violent predator is found to
be necessary by the legislature."1
The Act defines a sexually violent predator as a person: 1) who has
been "convicted of or charged with a sexually violent offense," and 2)
who "suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder which
makes the person likely to engage in the predatory acts of sexual vio-
lence."2 2 The Act defines mental abnormality as "a congenital or ac-
quired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity which
predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree
constituting such person a menace to the health and safety of others.,
23
The Act establishes a number of procedures and deadlines regarding
civil commitment proceedings. 24 Ninety days prior to a prisoners antici-
pated release, the agency with authority over the release must notify the
prosecutor in the county where the person was charged.2 5 The prosecu-
tor then has seventy-five days to file a petition alleging that the person is
a sexually violent predator, thus invoking the procedures under the Act.26
After receiving the petition, the district court judge determines whether
there i; probable cause that the person is a violent sexual predator.
2 7
Upon a finding of probable cause the judge orders the person to be evalu-
ated by a mental health professional.28
The Act also provides an array of procedural safeguards to protect
those persons subject to its terms. The district court is required to con-
duct a trial, within sixty days after the filing of the petition, to determine
21. 11.
22. See id. § 59-29a02(a).
23. See id. § 59-29a02(b)
24. See id. §§ 59-29a03-01.
25. See id. § 59-29a03.
26. See id. § 59-29a04.
27. See id. § 59-29a05.
28. See id. § 59-29a05.
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if the person is a sexually violent predator.2 9 Persons subject to the Act
have a right to counsel, a right to a jury trial, and a right to be examined
by their own mental health professional. 3' The Act also prohibits civil
commitment unless the state proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the
person is a sexually violent predator.31
Significantly, the Act continues to provide procedural safeguards once
a person has been committed.3 2 On an annual basis, the committed per-
son must be re-evaluated and the court must determine whether there is
probable cause to believe that the committed person may safely be re-
leased.33 Nothing shall prohibit the committed person from petitioning
the court for discharge at this time.34 If the court determines that prob-
able cause exists, then it must schedule a hearing where it is the State's
burden to prove "beyond reasonable doubt that the committed person's
mental abnormality or personality disorder remains such that the person
is not safe to be at large. . ... "3 At this hearing, the committed person is
entitled to all the constitutional protections that were provided at the ini-
tial commitment proceeding.36
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE: KANSAS V. HENDRICKS
Under the procedures of the KSVP Act, a Kansas jury determined that
Leroy Hendricks was a sexually violent predator.37 The evidence estab-
lished that Hendricks had spent approximately half of his adult life in jail,
and after every release, he perpetrated another sexually violent act
against a child. 38 Hendricks testified that "when he gets stressed out he is
unable to control the urge to engage in sexual activity with a child.",39 He
acknowledged that only his death would guarantee an end to his molesta-
29. See id. § 59-29a06.
30. Id.
31. See id. § 59-29a07.
32. See id. §§ 59-29a08, 59-29a10.
33. See id. § 59-29a08.
34. Id. The mental institution may also authorize the committed person to petition the
court for release at any time if it determines that the committed person is not likely to
commit predatory acts of sexual violence. Id. In this instance, a hearing must be held
where the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that it is not safe to release the
committed person. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a10 (1995).
35. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08 (1995).
36. Id.
37. In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 131 (Kan. 1996).
38. Id. at 131.
39. Id.
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tion of children.4° Consequently, Hendricks was committed to Lamed
State Security Hospital in 1994.41
Hendricks, however, appealed his commitment to the Kansas Supreme
Court, challenging the KSVP Act as unconstitutional.42 The Kansas
Supreme Court held, in In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, that the
KSVP Act did violate the substantive due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.43 The court concluded that the Act permitted the
detention of persons who were dangerous but not "mentally ill" and,
therefore, violated the United States Supreme Court's holding in Foucha
v. Lou isiana.44 The court reasoned that involuntary commitment re-
quires a finding of "mental illness" and that "mental abnormality," as
defined by the KSVP Act, did not qualify as such.45 The Kansas Supreme
Court, therefore, appears to have adopted the position that the term
"mentally ill" denotes a specific or precise medical condition, and that
civil commitment statutes must contain the term "mental illness" to with-
stand any due process challenge.46
40. id. at 143 (Larson, J., dissenting).
41. id. at 131.
42. Jn re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 130 (Kan. 1996).
43. id. at 138. The Kansas Supreme Court arrived at this holding despite the fact that
under Kansas law, if the validity of an act is challenged, the court must presume the act is
constitut:.onal and resolve all doubts in favor of the validity of the act. Id. "If there is any
reasonable way to construe the Act as constitutionally valid, [the court] must do so. The
Act must clearly violate the constitution before it may be struck down .... The burden of
proof is on the party challenging the constitutionality of the Act." Id. at 133 (citing Sed-
lack v. Dick, 887 P.2d 1119 (1995); Chiles v. State, 869 P.2d 707 (Kan. 1994); Boatright v.
Kansas Racing Comm'n, 834 P.2d 368 (Kan. 1992).
44. In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (Kan. 1996); See also
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1992) (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979))(holding commitment to a mental institution requires state to prove by clear and
convincirg evidence that the individual is both mentally ill and dangerous).
45. Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 129, 138.
46. In concluding that no finding of mental illness is required for commitment pur-
poses, thi Kansas Supreme Court relied, in part, on the preamble to the Act. The court
noted how the legislature found that sexually violent predators do not have a mental illness
that renders them appropriate for involuntary civil commitment pursuant to the existing
Kansas involuntary civil commitment statute. The legislature stated that "sexually violent
predators generally have antisocial personality features which are unamenable to existing
mental illness treatment modalities." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1995). The court then
illogically concluded that by such language, "the legislature recognizes that sexually violent
predators are not mentally ill but, rather, have an antisocial personality feature or a mental
abnormality." Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 129, 137. In making this statement, the court failed
to recognize that the legislature did not state that sexually violent predators are not men-
tally ill; rather the legislature stated that sexually violent predators do not have a mental
illness that renders them appropriate for involuntary civil commitment pursuant to the ex-
isting Kansas involuntary commitment statute. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1995). As will
19981
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In Kansas v. Hendricks, however, the United States Supreme Court
overruled the Kansas Supreme Court and upheld the KSVP Act as con-
stitutional.47 The Court held that the KSVP Act comports with substan-
tive due process because it requires a finding of both dangerousness and
mental abnormality or personality disorder prior to commitment.48 The
Court stated that the KSVP Act "requires a finding of future dangerous-
ness, and then links that finding to the existence of a 'mental abnormality'
or 'personality disorder' . . . . Significantly, the Court rejected the
Kansas Supreme Court's analysis and refused to hold that there was any
"talismanic significance" to the term "mental illness."5 Instead, the
Court held that a mental abnormality that makes a person likely to com-
mit predatory acts of sexual violence, as narrowly defined by the KSVP
Act, is sufficient for due process purposes.51 The following analysis pro-
vides an in-depth discussion of why such a holding by the United States
Supreme Court comports with over a decade of civil commitment
jurisprudence.
IV. ARGUMENT
A. The KSVP Act Fully Comports with Substantive Due Process
Requirements for Involuntary Indefinite Civil Commitment
1. The General Rule: Mental Illness and Dangerousness
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that
"[n]o State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property with-
out the due process of law."52 Thus, to involuntarily and indefinitely
become evident from subsequent analysis, this finding by the court oversimplifies psychiat-
ric diagnostic procedure and ignores the fact that the term "mental abnormality" has no
more clinical significance than the term "mental illness."
47. Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. 2072 (1997).
48. Id. at 2072-81.
49. Id. at 2080 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b)).
50. Id. at 2080 (stating that "[niot only do psychiatrists disagree widely and frequently
on what constitutes mental illness, but the Court itself has used a variety of expressions to
describe the mental condition of those properly subject to civil confinement.") (citations
omitted).
51. Id. at 2079-81.
52. The Due Process Clause protects individuals from two kinds of government ac-
tions. Substantive due process "prevents the government from engaging in conduct that
'shocks the conscience' . . . or interferes with rights 'implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty."' United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987)(quoting Rochin v. California,
342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) and Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)). Proce-
dural due process requires that when a government action that deprives an individual "of
life, liberty or property" survives substantive due process, it still must be implemented in a
Kansas v. Hendricks
commit an individual to a psychiatric hospital, in a civil proceeding, the
general rule is that a state must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the individual is both mentally ill and dangerous.53 This rule evolved
over time through United States Supreme Court case law.54
In O'Connor v. Donaldson, the United States Supreme Court first held
that a person who is mentally ill has a "right to liberty," and that a state
may not abridge this freedom by indefinitely locking up a person on the
sole basis of his or her mental illness.55 O'Connor established that, prior
to commitment, a state must prove that an individual is not only mentally
ill, but is likely to harm himself or others.56
In Addington v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court established
the burden of proof necessary for civil commitment purposes.57 Adding-
ton involved a challenge to a Texas law which permitted a state to commit
person; to mental institutions based on clear and convincing evidence
that the person was both mentally ill and dangerous.58 The Appellant
argued that the State should be required to employ the beyond a reason-
able doubt standard of proof.59 The Court rejected the mandate of the
higher beyond a reasonable doubt standard but explained that states
could adopt this standard if they desired.6° The Court then held that the
fair manner. Id. (quoting Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)). "Freedom from
bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause fiom arbitrary governmental action." Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)
(citing Ycungberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982)). "It is clear that commitment for
any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process pro-
tection." Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 361 (1983).
53. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992); see also Jones v. United States, 463
U.S. 354 (1983); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
54. See Foucha, 504 U.S. 71; Addington, 441 U.S. 418; O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422
U.S. 563 (1975).
55. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575.
56. H. In O'Connor, respondent Donaldson was civilly committed to a mental hospi-
tal for fifteen years against his will after it was determined before a county judge that he
was suffering from paranoid schizophrenia. Id. The evidence from the trial showed that
O'Connor, the hospital superintendent, had the power to release Donaldson if he thought
Donaldson was not dangerous to himself or others, even if he remained mentally ill. Id.
Donaldson repeatedly asked O'Connor to release him but O'Connor arbitrarily refused.
Id. The evidence did not indicate that Donaldson posed any dangers either before or dur-
ing his confinement. Id. O'Connor's defense at trial was that he believed state law author-
ized "indefinite custodial confinement of the sick, even if they were not given treatment
and their release could harm no one." Id. at 564-71.
57. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
58. Id. at 421-22.
59. Id.
60. Id. The Court rejected the "beyond a reasonable doubt standard" because, in light
of the uncertainties surrounding psychiatric diagnosis, it thought the state could never
1998]
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constitutional threshold for civil commitment purposes is at least the
clear and convincing standard.61
The United States Supreme Court, in Foucha v. Louisiana, applied the
holdings of O'Connor and Addington.62 Foucha involved a challenge to a
Louisiana law that allowed the state of Louisiana to automatically com-
mit a criminal defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity to a
mental institution.63 Under this law, Louisiana could continue to commit
an insanity acquitee until he was able to prove that he was not dangerous,
even if he regained his sanity. 64
The Court struck down the Louisiana law as violative of the Due Pro-
cess Clause.65 The Court held that to commit such a criminal defendant,
the State must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the person is
both mentally ill and dangerous.66 The Court noted that the "committed
acquitee is entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no
meet this burden and that this would therefore "erect an unreasonable barrier to needed
medical treatment." Id. at 432. The Court stated that "[gliven the lack of certainty and the
fallibility of psychiatric diagnosis, there is a serious question as to whether a state could
ever prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and danger-
ous." Id. at 429. The Court emphasized that "[i]f a trained psychiatrist has difficulty with
the categorical 'beyond a reasonable doubt' standard, the untrained lay juror - or indeed
even a trained judge - who is required to rely on expert opinion could be forced by the
criminal law standard of proof to reject commitment for many patients desperately in need
of institutionalized psychiatric care." Id. at 430.
61. Id. at 418. In adopting the clear and convincing standard of proof as the threshold
minimum, the Court rejected the preponderance of the evidence standard. Id. The Court
stated:
At one time or another every person exhibits some abnormal behavior which
might be perceived by some as symptomatic of a mental or emotional disorder,
but which is in fact within a range of conduct that is generally acceptable. Obvi-
ously, such behavior is no basis for compelled treatment and surely none for con-
finement. However, there is the possible risk that the factfinder might decide to
commit an individual based solely on a few isolated instances of unusual conduct.
Loss of liberty calls for a showing that the individual suffers from something more
serious that is demonstrated by idiosyncratic behavior. Increasing the burden of
proof is one way to impress the factfinder with the importance of the decision and
thereby perhaps to reduce the chances that inappropriate commitments will be
ordered.
Id. at 426-27.
62. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 73.
65. Id. at 80.
66. Id. at 75-76. The Court relied on Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), which
held that to commit an individual to a mental facility the state must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the individual is mentally ill and that he must be hospitalized for
his own welfare and for the protection of society. Id.
Kansas v. Hendricks
longer dangerous."67
2. Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act
The JKansas Sexually Violent Predator Act requires that, prior to com-
mitmert, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that an individ-
ual is a sexually violent predator.68 The Act defines a sexually violent
predator as "any person who has been convicted of or charged with a
sexually violent offense who suffers from a mental abnormality or person-
ality disorder which makes the person likely to engage in the predatory
acts of sexual violence." 69
The KSVP Act fully comports with substantive due process require-
ments as established by O'Connor, Addington and Foucha. First, the
Act's slandard of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, meets the threshold
level for standard of proof, clear and convincing evidence, as established
in Addington. Second, it is clear that the language of the Act requires a
finding of dangerousness prior to commitment.7 °
Finally, it is evident, that the term "mental abnormality," as defined in
the KSVP Act, qualifies as a "mental illness" for due process purposes.
The Court never has articulated a single definition of the term mental
illness with regard to civil commitment laws and never has required
states, in formulating their civil commitment laws, to specifically employ
the term "mental illness." Moreover, mental health professionals claim
that the term "mental illness" does not have any real clinical significance,
as the term ultimately depends on the clinical diagnosis of a "mental dis-
order" and derives its meaning in this manner.
a. The United States Supreme Court Has Not Enunciated a Precise
Constitutional Definition for "Mental Illness" Required for
Civil Commitment Purposes
In civil commitment cases, the United States Supreme Court has fre-
quently used the term "mental illness" interchangeably with an array of
67. Fgucha, 504 U.S. at 77 (quoting Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983)
(emphasis added). Jones v. United States held that "a verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity is sufficiently probative of mental illness and dangerousness to justify commitment
of the acquitee ... ." Id. at 354. The court reasoned: (1) the fact that the defendant has
been found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have committed a criminal act indicates dan-
gerousness, and (2) the fact that he committed the act because he is insane indicates that
he is mentally ill. Id. at 354-55.
68. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1995).
69. See id. § 59-29a02(a).
70. In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 133-38 (Kan. 1996).
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other terms used to describe mental imbalances.7 ' For example, in Jones
v. United States, the Court held that the finding of "insanity" at a criminal
trial was sufficiently probative of "mental illness" for involuntary civil
commitment purposes.72 In Foucha, the Court concluded that Foucha
should not be involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital because
he was not suffering from a "mental illness" or "mental disease., 7 3 The
Court, in Humphrey v. Cady, reasoned that a "mental aberration" might
amount to "mental illness" warranting civil commitment.74 Also, in Jack-
son v. Indiana, the Court commented that the civil commitment of "fee-
ble-minded" persons was not entirely inappropriate.7 5 Further, in
Addington, the Court discussed the State's interest in committing the
"emotionally disturbed" and addressed the expanding problems society
faces as a result of persons with "mental disorders. 76
Such frequent and interchangeable use by the Court demonstrates its
unwillingness to issue a precise definition of the term "mental illness" for
due process purposes.7 7 The Supreme Court has wisely refused to enun-
ciate a precise definition, as a constitutional threshold, because it recog-
nizes the evolving nature of psychology and psychiatry. 78 As Justice
Marshall wrote, in Powell v. Texas, where the Court refused to articulate
a constitutional test for insanity:
[n]othing could be less fruitful than for this court to be impelled
into defining some sort of insanity test in constitutional
terms.... [To do so] would reduce, if not eliminate, that fruitful
experimentation, and freeze the developing productive dialogue
between the law and psychiatry into a rigid constitutional mold.
It is simply not yet the time to write into the constitution formulas
cast in terms whose meaning, let alone relevance, is not yet clear
either to doctors or lawyers.79
Similarly, in his dissent in In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, Judge
71. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80; Jones, 463 U.S. at 363-64; Addington, 441 U.S. at 426;
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 730-31 (1972); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 511
(1972).
72. Jones, 463 U.S. at 354.
73. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80.
74. Humphrey, 405 U.S. at 511.
75. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 728 n.6.
76. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-26.
77. See In re Lineham, 544 N.W.2d 308, 317-18 (Minn. 1996); State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d
115, 123 (Wis. 1995); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 n.3 (Wash. 1993).
78. See In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 149 (Kan. 1996); Powell
v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536-37 (1968); Post, 541 N.W.2d at 123.
79. Powell, 392 U.S. at 536-37.
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Larson wrote that "there is no justification for linking constitutional stan-
dards to the shifting sands of academic thought .... "I'
As a result, the Court has effectively ruled that the task of defining the
"mental illness" required for involuntary confinement should be left to
the state legislature, rather than the judiciary."1 State legislatures are in a
better position to work in conjunction with the medical community to
draft and update legislation that accurately reflects current medical
knowledge. As Justice Powell stated, in Jones:
'The only certain thing that can be said about the present state
of knowledge and therapy regarding mental disease is that sci-
ence has not reached finality of judgment .... ' The lesson we
have drawn is not that government may not act in the face of
this uncertainty but rather that courts should pay particular def-
erence to reasonable legislative judgments.8 2
In drafting civil commitment legislation, the United States Supreme
Court has given state legislators broad powers.8 3 For example, in Add-
ington, the Court held "[a]s the substantive standards for civil commit-
ment may vary from state to state, procedures must be allowed to vary so
long as they meet the constitutional minimum.'"" The Court emphasized
that "the essence of federalism is that states must be free to develop a
variety of solutions to problems and not be forced into a common, uni-
form mold."8 5 Moreover, in Jackson v. Indiana, the Court commented on
the traditionally broad power of the stateswith regard to civil commit-
ment and noted that "the substantive limitations on the exercise of this
power and the procedures for invoking it vary drastically among the
[s]tates. ' 86
Therefore, not surprisingly, the United States Supreme Court has not
required the states to specifically include the term "mental illness" in
their civil commitment statutes. 87 In Allen v. Illinois, for example, the
Court upheld the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act as constitu-
tional, despite the fact that the Act did not contain the term "mental ill-
80. In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 149.
81. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 365, n.13 (1983).
82. Ic. at 366 n.13 (quoting Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366 (1956)).
83. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1979); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986).
84. Addington, 441 U.S. at 431.
85. Id.
86. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 736-37.
87. See Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986); See State of Minnesota ex rel Pearson v.
Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270 (1940).
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ness."88 This Act committed sexually dangerous persons who suffered
from "a mental disorder ... coupled with criminal propensities to the
commission of sex offenses, and who have demonstrated propensities to-
ward acts of sexual assault or ... sexual molestation of children."89
Thus, in Kansas v. Hendricks, clearly the United States Supreme Court
did not offend traditional notions of due process in upholding the KSVP
Act despite the fact that the Kansas legislature opted not to employ the
term "mental illness." Clearly, no constitutional significance adheres to
this term, and the term "mental abnormality," as narrowly defined by the
KSVP Act, equally satisfies due process. Moreover, in upholding the
KSVP Act on substantive due process grounds, the Court wisely deferred
to the principles of federalism, and, specifically, to the Kansas legislature,
who, at the guidance of mental health professionals, narrowly defined
mental abnormality as persons who are predisposed to commit predatory
acts of sexual violence.
b. According to Mental Health Professionals the Term "Mental
Abnormality," As Defined in the KSVP Act, Is
Interchangeable with the Term "Mental Illness"
Qualified mental health professionals determine whether an individual
suffers from a "mental illness" for purposes of state involuntary civil com-
mitment laws in a two-step process:
First, an individual must be diagnosed by a qualified mental
health professional as having a specific disorder defined in the
DSM-IV9° or otherwise generally accepted in the field. Second,
the professional must determine whether the disorder 91 is of a
type and severity that would warrant commitment to a psychiat-
88. Allen, 478 U.S. at 364.
89. Id. at 364 n.1.
90. The DSM-IV is the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, pub-
lished by the American Psychiatric Association in 1994. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AssocI-
ATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS at xxi (4th ed.
1994).
91. The DSM-IV defines "mental disorder" as a:
clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs
in an individual that is associated with present distress (painful symptoms) or dis-
ability (the impairment in one or more important areas of functioning) or with
significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain or disability or important loss
of freedom.
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS at xxi (4th ed. 1994).
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ric hospital.92
Similarly, qualified mental health professionals would determine that a
person suffers from a "mental abnormality," as defined by the KSVP Act,
by using the exact same two-step process: "[f]irst, the clinician deter-
mines whether the individual suffers from a mental disorder .... The
second step of the process is to determine whether the disorder is of the
type and severity to merit civil commitment .... "
Thus, irrespective of whether the KSVP Act employs the term "mental
illness" or "mental abnormality," the threshold question for mental
health analysis becomes whether or not the individual suffers from a
"mental disorder." The fact that the threshold question pertains to
"mental disorder" and not "mental illness" is not surprising in light of the
fact that the DSM-IV includes no reference whatsoever to the term
"mental illness." 94 Moreover, it is also not surprising in light of the fact
that the Longman Dictionary of Psychology and Psychiatry defines
"mental illness" as a "mental disorder."95
c. The Term "Mental Abnormality," As Defined by the KSVP Act,
Has Clinical Meaning to Mental Health Professionals
The ]Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act defines mental abnormality
as "a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or voli-
tional capacity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent
offenses in a degree constituting such person a menace to the health and
safety of others."96
Menial health experts, under the first step discussed above, understand
this definition to encompass "certain severe forms of paraphilia," that are
92. See Brief of the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers ("ATSA") Ami-
cus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 4-5, In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912
P.2d 129, 149 (Kan. 1996). ATSA is a
non-profit international organization consisting of over 1,100 professionals who
specialize in the research, treatment, assessment and supervision of sexual abus-
ers. ATSA's membership is drawn from all 50 states and 9 foreign countries. The
membership includes the most prominent clinicians and researchers in the field.
Clinical membership requires an advanced degree in a recognized mental health
profession plus 2,000 additional hours of experience in evaluating and treating
sexual offenders ....
Id.
93. Id. at 6-8.
94. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC AssocIATiON, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994).
95. LONGMAN DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHIATRY 451 (1984).
96. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02(b) (1995).
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sexual disorders defined in the DSM-IV.9" "The disorders are character-
ized by recurrent, intense, sexually-arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or be-
haviors generally involving: (1) non-human subjects; (2) the suffering of
humiliation of oneself or one's partner; or (3) children or other non-con-
senting persons."" Moreover, for a person to be diagnosed with
paraphilia, "the fantasies, urges and behaviors must occur over a period
of at least six months."9 9 The diagnostic criteria "eliminates occasional,
or situational offenders, and ensures the presence of a chronic condi-
tion."'1 Consequently, paraphilia does not include "unusual sexual be-
haviors due to mental retardation, dementia, personality change due to a
general medical condition, substance intoxication, a manic episode, or
schizophrenia." 10 1
Under the second step of the aforementioned process, mental health
experts "determine whether the disorder is of the type and severity to
merit civil commitment as a sexually violent predator."'"2 The sexual dis-
order of paraphilia "can be characterized as mild, moderate or severe
depending on the number of symptoms present and the degree to which
those symptoms impair social functioning."'0 3 Because the KSVP Act
defines a "sexually violent predator" as a person who has been convicted
or charged with a sexually violent offense and who suffers from mental
abnormality, which makes the person likely to engage in predatory acts of
sexual violence, the psychiatric diagnosis will "in practice always involve
moderate or more often, severe forms of paraphilia."'' 4
Thus, the term "mental abnormality," as defined in the context of the
KSVP Act, has a clear meaning to mental health professionals and is not
vague or conclusory. The Kansas Supreme Court holding that the term
"mental abnormality" does not have clinical significance and cannot be
used in formal diagnosis was therefore misguided."0 5 Moreover, the Kan-
sas Supreme Court holding that the KSVP Act allows the commitment of
persons not mentally ill was also misguided. As illustrated above, the
97. See Brief of the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers ("ATSA") Ami-
cus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 6, In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d
129, 149 (Kan. 1996).
98. Id. (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, ASSOCIATION DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 522-23 (4th ed. 1994)).
99. Id. at 6.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 8.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 137-38 (Kan. 1996).
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United States Supreme Court, in Kansas v. Hendricks, rightfully over-
ruled the holding by the Kansas Supreme Court, holding that there is no
constitutional or clinical significance to the term "mental illness." Fur-
thermore, it held that the term "mental abnormality," as defined in the
KSVP Act, satisfies the substantive due process requirements of
O'Connor, Addington, and Foucha. °6
B. The KSVP Act Does Not Fall Within the Ambit of the Due Process
Clause Exception
1. The Due Process Clause Exception: Mere Dangerousness
To involuntarily commit an individual to a psychiatric hospital, Sub-
stantive due process requires that a state prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the individual is both mentally ill and dangerous. °7 The
United State Supreme Court, however, has enunciated an exception to
this general rule: "in certain narrow circumstances persons who pose a
danger to others or to the community may be subject to limited confine-
ment .... "'08
Significantly, this exception requires no proof of mental illness.' 019 In-
voluntary confinement, which must be limited in duration, is based on
dangerousness alone." 0 Such an exception reflects the Court's philoso-
phy that the government has the power to require dangerous individuals
to sacrifice their liberty interest for the safety of the common good."' As
106. Id. The claim that the term "mental abnormality" is not satisfactory for due pro-
cess purposes because it is not a psychiatric or medical term,-but, rather, a legal term,
defined in an Act, is misguided as well. The fact that a term is legal rather than medical is
no bar to holding the Act constitutional. Psychologists and psychiatrists consistently have
been asked to diagnose an individual as "insane" or "competent," or as suffering from a
"mental disease or defect or mental illness." Such terms are legal, not medical. See, e.g.
United States v. McDonald, 312 F.2d 847, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1962) ("What psychiatrists may
consider a 'mental disease or defect' for clinical purposes ... ,may or may not be the same
as mental disease or defect for the jury's purpose of determining criminal responsibility.");
United States v. Freeman, 357 F.2d 606, 622 (2d Cir. 1966) ("[A] test [for 'mental disease'
in a criminal proceeding] which permits all to stand or fall upon the labels or classifications
employed by testifying psychiatrists hardly affords the court the opportunity to perform its
function of rendering an independent legal and social judgment.").
107. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354
(1983).
108. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992); see also United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739 (1987).
109. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80; Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-49; Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S.
253, 263-1 (1984).
110. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80; Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748-49; Schall, 467 U.S. at 263-81.
111. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905).
1998]
554 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 14:537
the Court explained in Jacobson v. Massachusetts:
the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to
every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute
right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances,
wholly free from restraint. There are manifold restraints to
which every person is necessarily subject for the common good.
On any other basis organized society could not exist. 12
The United States Supreme Court has addressed involuntary confine-
ment on the mere basis of dangerousness in an array of cases, including
Foucha v. Louisiana,113 United States v. Salerno,"4 and Schall v.
Martin,l1 5
In Foucha, as discussed above, a defendant challenged a law that al-
lowed Louisiana to civilly commit insanity acquitees until they were able
to prove that they were not dangerous, even if they regained their san-
ity.' 16 Thus, the Court considered whether the commitment of insanity
acquitees on the mere basis of dangerousness comported with substantive
due process."
7
In arriving at its holding, the Court cited U.S. v. Salerno where defend-
ants who were being detained prior to trial, pursuant to a Bail Reform
Act, challenged the constitutionality of their detention, claiming it vio-
lated their rights to substantive due process. 1 8 Under the Act, courts
were required to "detain prior to trial arrestees charged with certain seri-
ous felonies if the Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evi-
dence after an adversary hearing that no release conditions will
reasonably assure . . . the safety of any other person and the
community."" 9
The Court, in Salerno, upheld the Bail Reform Act as constitutional
because it was narrowly tailored to serve the State's legitimate and com-
pelling interest 2 ° and to protect against unnecessary and erroneous dep-
112. Id.
113. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 71.
114. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739.
115. Schall, 467 U.S. at 253.
116. Foucha, 504 U.S. at 73.
117. Id. at 73.
118. Id. at 80-81 (citing Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739).
119. Id. at 739 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e))(Supp.III 1982)).
120. Id. at 749 (citing De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960)). The Court held
that the government's interest in preventing arrestees from committing crime was both
legitimate and compelling. Id. In upholding the Act, the Court said: "[w]e have repeat-
edly held that the Government's regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropri-
ate circumstances, outweigh an individual's liberty interest." Id. at 748.
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rivations of liberty: 1) the Act operated only on individuals who were
arrested for "a specific category of extremely serious offenses; ' 121 2) the
government needed probable cause to detain the arrestee who committed
the charged crime; 12 2 3) the government, in a rather extensive adversary
hearing, needed to "convince a neutral decision maker by clear and con-
vincing- evidence that no conditions of release reasonably can assure the
safety of the community;' ' 123 4) the arrestee was entitled to a prompt ad-
versary hearing, 24 and; 5) the maximum length of the pretrial detention
was limited in duration.' 2 5 The Court in Foucha then held that "Salerno
does not save Louisiana's detention of insanity acquitees who are no
longer mentally ill. Unlike the sharply focused scheme at issue in Sa-
lerno, the Louisiana scheme of confinement is not carefully limited."' 26
The Court emphasized that, in Foucha, the criminal defendant was not
entitled to an adversary hearing where the state had to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he was demonstrably dangerous to the commu-
nity.a1 7 Conversely, the state needed to prove nothing; the burden was
on the criminal defendant to prove that he was not dangerous. 128 Also,
the detention of the criminal defendant was not limited strictly in dura-
tion.' 29 The Louisiana law allowed the state to hold any criminal defend-
ant for an indefinite period. 130 Consequently, the Court concluded that
the Louisiana law did not fall within the carefully limited exception per-
mitted by the Due Process Clause. 3'
In Fcucha, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion is particularly note-
worthy.' 32 She emphasized that the majority's opinion addressed only
the statutory scheme that broadly permitted the involuntary confinement
of insanity acquitees after they regained their sanity.133 She emphasized
the FoLucha case did not pass judgment on more narrowly drawn stat-
utes.'3 Thus, Justice O'Connor explained, "[i]t might therefore be possi-
121. Id. at 750 (citing 18 U.S.C § 3142(f)).
122. I. at 750.
123. Ld. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)).
124. Id. at 747.
125. Id.
126. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81 (1992).
127. hM.
128. Id. at 81-82.
129. Id. at 82-83.
130. Id. at 83.
131. Id.
132. Flucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86-90 (1992)(O'Connor, J., concurring).
133. IM. at 86-87 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 87 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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ble for Louisiana to confine an insanity acquitee who has regained sanity
if, unlike the situation in this case, the nature and duration of detention
were tailored to reflect pressing public safety concerns related to the ac-
quitees continuing dangerousness."' 3 5 As in Foucha and Salerno, in
Schall v. Martin, the United States Supreme Court also considered cir-
cumstances in which involuntary commitment may be based merely on
dangerousness.13 6 In Schall, defendants, who were detained under the
New York Family Court Act, claimed that the pre-trial detention permit-
ted under the Act violated their substantive due process rights.137 The
New York Family Court Act authorized "pretrial detention of an accused
juvenile delinquent based on a finding that there is a serious risk that the
child may 'before the return date commit an act which if committed by an
adult could constitute a crime.'
' 138
The Court stated that two separate inquiries must be made to deter-
mine if the civil commitment law is "compatible with the fundamental
fairness" required by the Due Process Clause. These inquiries include:
1) whether the preventative detention serves a legitimate state interest;
and, 2) whether adequate procedural safeguards are established to pre-
vent erroneous and unnecessary deprivations of liberty.
139
135. Id. at 87-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing U.S. v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747-51
(1987); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264-71 (1984); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738
(1972)). Jackson is significant to United States Supreme Court civil commitment jurispru-
dence because it held that "[a]t the least, due process requires that the nature and duration
of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed." Id.
In Jackson, the defendant, Jackson, was civilly committed for three and one half years
because he was incompetent to stand trial. Jackson had a mental I.Q. of a pre-school child.
Id. An Indiana statute allowed a judge to indefinitely commit to a mental institution a
person who was incompetent to stand trial until he regained such capacity. Id. The prob-
lem in this case was that Jackson was a mentally defective deaf mute; he had a mental
capacity of a pre-school child and probably would never regain competency. Id.
The United States Supreme Court held that the indefinite confinement of a criminal
defendant solely on account of his incompetency to stand trial was violative of due process.
Id. at 718. The Court emphasized that the Indiana statute did not provide adequate com-
mitment procedures. Id. For example, Jackson was not afforded formal commitment pro-
ceedings: (1) addressed to society's interest in his restraint; or (2) addressed to the ability
of the state to assist him in obtaining competency through custodial care; or (3) addressed
to his ability to function in society. Id. Thus, the Court held that the nature and duration
of commitment did not bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which he was
committed and that his commitment, therefore, violated substantive due process. Id.
136. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 255 (quoting NEW YORK JUD. LAW § 320.5 (McKinney 1983)).
139. Id. at 263-64 (1984); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534 n.15; Matthews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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The Court held that the New York Family Court Act did serve a legiti-
mate and compelling state interest in "protecting the community from
crime."' 4° Crime prevention, it held, is "a weighty social objective."' 41
The Court emphasized that the state had legitimate parens patriae inter-
est in promoting and preserving child welfare and in preventing juveniles
from committing crimes. 42
The Court also held that the procedures provided by the New York
Family Court Act did provide sufficient protections against erroneous
and unnecessary deprivations of liberty. 14 3 The Court commented on the
following necessary procedures under the Act: 1) the juvenile was enti-
tled to an initial, stenographically recorded, hearing where the juvenile
was given full notice of the charges against him; 2) the juvenile had to be
informed of his rights to remain silent and his right to be represented by
counse.l; 3) the juvenile was entitled to a formal, adversarial probable-
cause hearing no more than three days after the initial appearance hear-
ing; 4) the burden at the adversarial hearing was on the agency to call
witnesses and offer evidence in support of the charges; 5) the accused
juvenile had a right to call witnesses and offer evidence on his own behalf;
and 6) the court needed to find probable cause to continue to detain the
juvenile. 44
2. The KSVP Act Does Not Fall Within the Ambit of the Due
Process Clause Exception
Salerno and Schall both held that to pass constitutional muster and to
adequately fall within the ambit of the Due Process Clause exception, the
Act must satisfy two constitutional thresholds. First, the Act must serve
the state's legitimate and compelling interest. Second, the Act must be
narrowly focused on "a particularly acute problem in which the govern-
140. Schall, 467 U.S. at 264 (citing De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960)); See
also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
141. Schall, 467 U.S. at 264 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979)).
142. 1. at 265 (citations omitted). Significantly, the Court in Schall specifically rejected
the contention "that it is impossible to predict future [dangerous] behavior" and that such
predictions are "so vague as to be meaningless." Id. at 279 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262, 274 (1976)). The Court recognized "that a prediction of future [dangerous] crimi-
nal conduct is an experienced prediction based on a host of variables which cannot be
readily codified." Id. at 279 (quoting Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 16
(1979)).
143. Schall, 467 U.S. at 277. Specifically, the Court stated that these procedures "have
been found constitutionally adequate under the Fourth Amendment." Id. (citing Kent v.
United States, 383 U.S. 541, 557 (1966)).
144. I1. at 274-77.
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ment's interests are overwhelming." '145
The KSVP Act that was at issue in Kansas v. Hendricks clearly satisfies
the first of these constitutional thresholds. As the Court has already held
in both Salerno and Schall, the state has a legitimate and compelling in-
terest in preventing crime.14 6 The KSVP Act specifically was designed to
combat public safety problems caused by recidivist sexual offenders. 147
This is evident from the preamble to the KSVP Act which refers to a
"small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators" who
generally have "antisocial personality features" that render them highly
likely to engage in repeat sexually violent behavior.' 48 Moreover, the
preamble of the Act declared that the existing involuntary commitment
procedures were inadequate to address the risks posed by these sexually
violent predators. 4 9 Consequently, the KSVP Act was enacted in an ex-
press attempt to combat this problem and to protect the community from
the violent sexual crimes committed by repeat violent sexual offenders.
The more difficult question is whether the KSVP Act satisfies the sec-
ond constitutional threshold as established in Salerno, Schall and
Foucha."5 ° Is the KSVP Act narrowly focused to serve the state's legiti-
mate and compelling interest in combatting repeat sexually violent crime
and does the Act provide sufficient protections against erroneous and un-
necessary deprivations of liberty?' 5 '
Significantly, the procedural protection provided by the KSVP Act is
very similar to the protection provided in Salerno: 1) the KSVP Act op-
erates only on individuals who are arrested for a specific category of ex-
145. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749-50 (1987); Schall, 467 U.S. at 263-64
(1984). Salerno also established that the state must meet the intermediate burden of clear
and convincing evidence to civilly confine an arrestee who is deemed dangerous and not
mentally ill. Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739. It is clear that the KSVP Act meets this burden
because, under the Act, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a person is
dangerous and likely to commit predatory acts of sexual violence. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
29a01. See also In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 133-38 (Kan. 1996).
146. . Salerno, 481 U.S. at 749 (citing De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 155 (1960));
Schall, 467 U.S. at 264 (quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979)); see In re Young,
857 P.2d 989, 1000 (Wash. 1993) ("it is irrefutable that the State has a compelling interest
both in treating sex predators and protecting society from their actions."). Id.
147. In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 131-32.
148. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1995).
149. Id.
150. Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80-81 (1992); Salerno, 481 U.S. at 750; Schall, 467
U.S. at 264.
151. See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a01-29all (1995).
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tremely serious offenses;152 2) the court must have probable cause before
commitment proceedings can proceed;153 3) the state must prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the person is a sexually violent predator; 154 4)
persons subject to the proceedings of the KSVP Act are entitled to a trial
within sixty days after the filing of the petition, to determine whether the
person is a sexually violent predator;155 and 5) persons subject to the Act
have a right to counsel, a right to a jury trial, and a right to be examined
by their own mental health professional. 56
There is, however, one significant distinction between the procedural
protection provided in Salerno and Schall and that afforded by the KSVP
Act. The Acts at issue in Salerno and Schall merely detained persons
awaiting trial, whereas, the KSVP Act appears to detain persons for a
longer period of time.157 The Court in Foucha, however, implied that an
insane person may be confined to a mental institution based on danger-
ousness alone, even if he regains sanity, if the nature and duration of the
detention is sufficiently narrowly tailored. 5 s
Thu;, the crux of whether the KSVP Act can be upheld under the Due
Process Clause exception appears to depend upon whether confinement
under the Act is limited in duration.'59 Several of the amicus briefs that
were filed before the Court in Kansas v. Hendricks urged that the KSVP
Act comports with the Due Process Clause exception because the dura-
tion of the commitment under the Act is limited: the Act requires all
committed persons to be re-evaluated on an annual basis, and, if the state
desires to continue commitment for more than one year, the district judge
needs to conclude that no probable cause exists to believe that the person
is safe to be released into the community, or the factfinder must again
determine that the person is a sexually violent offender beyond a reason-
able doubt. 6 °
152. Specifically, the Act pertains only to those individuals who satisfy the definition of
"sexually violent predator" under § 59-29a02. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a02 (1995).
153. See id. § 59-29a05.
154. See id. § 59-29a07(a).
155. See id. § 59-29a06.
156. Id.
157. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
158. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. at 71, 81-83, 87-88 (1992).
159. See Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80; Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739.
160. See Brief of Washington Legal Foundation, Amicus Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioner, at 12-19, In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 133-38 (Kan. 1996);
see also Brief of the Menninger Foundation, Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, at 18-
20, In re Care and Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 133-38 (Kan. 1996); see also KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08 1995).
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The KSVP Act does not fall within the ambit of the Due Process
Clause exception because although the nature of the commitment is suffi-
ciently narrow, as in Salerno and Schall, the duration of the commitment
is not sufficiently narrow as required by Foucha. This is due to the fact
that commitment under the Act is for an unlimited duration, or, alterna-
tively, that commitment under the Act is not clearly limited in duration.
Under the Act, a person will not be released from civil commitment un-
less the district judge concludes that there is probable cause that the per-
son can safely be released into the community.' 6 ' Since, such a release is
dependent on affirmative action by the district judge, confinement under
the Act is not clearly limited in duration.16 The United States Supreme
Court, in Kansas v. Hendricks, was not forced to decide the issue of
whether the KSVP Act fell within the ambit of the Due Process Clause
exception because it upheld the Act under the general due process rule,
namely, that the Act required a finding of both dangerousness and
mental abnormality. 163 The Court would have been faced with this issue
if the Court had determined that "mental abnormality" did not suffice as
the "mental illness" required for due process purposes.
Even though the Court did not address this issue, the Court did state
that involuntary civil confinement of a limited subclass of dangerous per-
sons is not contrary to our understanding of ordered liberty. 164 The
Court also stated that "certain narrow circumstances provided for the for-
cible civil detainment of people who are unable to control their behavior
and who thereby pose a danger to the public health and safety., 165 But
161. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a08 (1995).
162. As one commentator noted concerning sexual predator laws such as the KSVP
Act:
the requirement that a judge or jury must decide beyond a reasonable doubt that
a person fits the definition, is for those with any experience in the jury system,
laughable. What happens is that a person is convicted of an offense, given the
maximum time allowed by law, and after serving the sentence, someone in a posi-
tion of authority decides that was not enough time, and off one goes to the mental
institution for treatment of their abnormality. For how long? As long as we de-
cide to keep you there.
Eric Pearson, Letters Delivery of Welfare Service Shouldn't Be Done for Profit, ATLANTA
J., June 27, 1997, at A19.
163. The Court stated "[w]e have sustained civil commitment statutes when they have
coupled proof of dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor such as a 'mental
illness' or 'mental abnormality."' Kansas v. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 2080 (1997) (citing
Heller v. Doe, 503 U.S. 312, 323 (1933) (discussing Kentucky statute permitting commit-
ment of dangerous "mentally retarded" or "mentally ill" individuals)).
164. Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2080.
165. Id. at 2079.
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the Court then stated that "[a] finding of dangerousness, standing alone,
is ordinarily not a sufficient ground upon which to justify indefinite invol-
untary commitment." '166 The Court did not elaborate on when such a
circumstance might arise that would permit indefinite involuntary civil
commitment based merely on dangerousness.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court case, Kansas v. Hendricks, is signifi-
cant1 6l' because states now have the authority to involuntary and indefi-
nitely commit sexually violent predators to mental hospitals after they
serve their prison sentence.168 Moreover, the Court confirmed the tradi-
tionally broad power the states have in defining the mental illness neces-
sary for civil commitment comporting with due process and in defining
"terms of medical nature that have legal significance."1 69
166. Id. at 2080.
167. Howard Zonana, in his article, The Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, comments
on the impact Kansas v. Hendricks will have on the cost of treatment for sex offenders. He
states:
[tireatment for this group requires maximum security treatment facilities and can-
not be accomplished in the usual hospital settings. Annual cost estimates range
from $60,000 to $130,000 per patient. These do not include the costs for the com-
mitment proceedings (attorneys and experts) or for any needed construction of
facilities. It is three or four times more expensive to provide hospitalization than
to give longer prison sentences.
Howard Zonana, The Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 278 SCIENCE 5431 (Nov. 14,
1997).
168. Since the United States Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Kansas v. Hen-
dricks, tinere are at least "[s]even states that have sexually violent predator laws, and 30
others that are considering them. New Jersey, Washington, Arizona, California, Kansas,
Minnesota, and Wisconsin have laws that allow sex offenders to be held in mental institu-
tions after they finish their prison sentence." Tom Bromwell, Close to Home - A Stronger
Megan's Law, WASH. POST, Sept. 28, 1997, at C08. Moreover, since Kansas v. Hendricks,
the New York Senate passed a bill allowing for the commitment of sexually violent
predators subsequent to the service of prison sentences. Cecil Connolly, Some States Rac-
ing to Grasp Baton of Power Passed by High Court, WASH. POST, June 29, 1997, at A16.
See also Tom Bromwell, Close to Home - A Stronger Megan's Law, WASH. POST, Sept. 28,
1997, at C08 ("During the 1998 General Assembly session, I will sponsor legislation to
expand Maryland's Megan's Law to provide that sex offenders, who are at risk of commit-
ting repeated sex crimes, can be confined indefinitely in a mental institution after they
have served their prison sentence."). See also Tony Lang, Longer Lock-Up For Sex
Predators, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, June 27, 1997, at A18 (stating "Ohio, Kentucky and
Indiana lawmakers ought to pounce on this week's Supreme Court ruling in Kansas v.
Hendrick-s and enact their own violent sexual predator laws.").
169. See Hendricks, 117 S.Ct. at 2081 (noting that "[i]ndeed we have never required
State legislatures to adopt any particular nomenclature in drafting civil commitment stat-
utes. Rather, we have traditionally left to the legislators the task of defining terms of
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medical nature that have legal significance."). Some commentators state that cases such as
Hendricks demonstrate that "the nation is witnessing a dramatic retreat from the strong
federalism begun during the Depression and lasting well into the 1980s." Cecil Connolly,
Some States Racing to Grasp Baton of Power Passed by High Court, WASH. POST, June 29,
1997, at A16. See also Joan Biskupic, Court Gives States Leeway in Confining Sex Offend-
ers, WASH. POST, June 24, 1997, at A01 ("[Kansas v. Hendricks] ... gives legislators signifi-
cant new leeway to extend the confinement of such convicts.").
